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In this segment Fox New's Bill O'Reilly says that he "doesn't care what adults do, I don't care if they smoke pot." You then goes on to explain that he doesn't want children to smoke pot.
Bill O'Reilly and I are in complete agreement. Especially considering that the most harmful aspect of pot smoking is heightened in younger people. So make it legal for anyone above the age of 18.
Also note Chong's awesome shirt.
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
I want to be a Member of Parliament
Usually I would sputter in outrage at the government using tax dollars for the purpose of boozing up MPs. But with billions of dollars being thrown into the waste basket every year, I just can't work up the same energy for $2 000. (Though I am surprised that the Speaker of the House has an entertaining budget of $170 000. What affairs of state would really require a Speaker to entertain?)
So instead I'm going to be very jealous. I am a man who loves his scotch (in my more honest moments I will admit that is part of the reason I came to Edinburgh for grad school). The idea that I could go to a free scotch tasting, if only I convince about 30 000 of my neighbours to send me as their voice in the Parliament of the People, is surprisingly enticing.
I may run next time around.
So instead I'm going to be very jealous. I am a man who loves his scotch (in my more honest moments I will admit that is part of the reason I came to Edinburgh for grad school). The idea that I could go to a free scotch tasting, if only I convince about 30 000 of my neighbours to send me as their voice in the Parliament of the People, is surprisingly enticing.
I may run next time around.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
The best thing written about the Krieber thing
This from Scot Feschuk at Maclean's.
It is one of those rare posts that make me really wish I had written it. Though I will add one thing to it. My favourite thing about the Krieber incident is that I did not know the name of Dion's wife before this little foray into commentary. Way to be known Mrs. Krieber.
It is one of those rare posts that make me really wish I had written it. Though I will add one thing to it. My favourite thing about the Krieber incident is that I did not know the name of Dion's wife before this little foray into commentary. Way to be known Mrs. Krieber.
How to get your readers to read your article
This was the opening paragraph of this article:
Students from a Mississauga high school reached out and touched the Prime Minister's Office today, and are claiming that the PMO touched back.
Kinky eh?
Students from a Mississauga high school reached out and touched the Prime Minister's Office today, and are claiming that the PMO touched back.
Kinky eh?
Saturday, November 21, 2009
Why are policies different?
There are three factors to why policies that address the same issue vary so much between political systems: ideas, interests, and institutions. No study of policy differences would be complete without reference to all three of these concepts. Ideas are defined in this essay as Craig Parsons defines them: “claims about descriptions of the world, casual relationships or the normative legitimacy of certain actions.”(Parsons 2002: 48) Interests are defined along an economic or rational choice model. That is, each actor attempts to maximize their own utility. Institutions will be defined as formal arrangements of individuals who are regulated by enforceable rules and decision making (Pontusson 1995: 25).
Each of these concepts has a place within the policy process. Solutions and perceptions of issues originate with ideas. If there is a sufficiently powerful actor with an interest connected to that issue or solution, then the policy is placed on the political agenda. Once the various actors’ interests have been negotiated or pacified the policy is adopted by the institutions. The institutions then adapt the policy to fit the existing framework. This is a simplified model of how policy is developed and implemented. It is also a simplification of the relationship between the three concepts. This model will however serve to demonstrate the reasons that policy differs between polities.
Ideas, the first stage of the model, are fundamental in explaining the origin of policy (Beland 2009: 703). Daniel Beland writes that ideas shape assumptions, provide discursive tools for actors, and often shape the agenda (Beland 2009: 702). Ideas are the most significant for how they shape assumptions. Organizational institutionalists argue that cultural assumptions produce certain policy outcomes (Campbell 1998: 382). The example of this given by Frank Dobin (as cited Campbell 1998: 382) is the difference in which France and the United States of America handled the construction of a railway network. USA, with a more individualist cultural bias, was more decentralized in their railway construction than collectivist France.
Beyond affecting solutions, ideas can shape the perception of what needs to be solved. Jean-Claude Barbier discussed French concepts of employment precariousness and its lack of counterpart in the United Kingdom (Barbier 2004). French and British employment policy would thus differ greatly because United Kingdom officials would not consider precariousness whereas it would be central in France’s employment policy. The assumptions formed by ideas create this policy difference at the very beginning of the process.
In any polity there is a limited space for policy debate on the political agenda (Beland 2009: 705). It requires a significant actor, such as political parties, unions, public servants, or businesses, to move this policy onto the agenda (Campbell 1998: 379). This is the second stage of the model mentioned in the introduction.
Since policies require an interested actor to get on the political agenda, the variant interests and distribution in power within different polities explains differences between policy outcomes. Distribution of power is important because having an interested actor is not always enough. Some actors may not be powerful enough to overcome the counter interests of another actor (Galston 2006: 549). Iain McLean in his article Rational Choice and Politics enters into a discussion of the power relations between actors with his use of the prisoner’s dilemma (McLean 1991: 502). He first assumes that politicians and civil servants, as human beings, are self interested (McLean 1991: 500). They may occasionally act in the interests of the greater good, but it is extraordinarily rare that any human being would act radically against their own interest. It is therefore important to understand how power relations work to understand why some policies are implemented and others are not.
The power relations and indeed the interests of actors are partly shaped by the institutions (Pontusson 1995: 119). It is the institutionalized power relations and interests that are crucial to the development of policy (Pontusson 1995: 120). Consider the electoral system as an example of an institution that shapes interests. Kenneth Arrow points out that in any electorate there are many possible majorities and it is the institutions that give them shape (Galston 2006: 545). A real world example of a policy affected by an electoral system would be the USA’s environmental policy bias towards ethanol fuel. The reason for this bias can easily be traced to the order of Presidential primaries, which give corn growers in Iowa disproportionate power. Presidential candidates give their support for ethanol to ensure that they would gain an early lead against their opponents. In this way the institution of the electoral system influences the policies that politicians have an interest in.
Beyond institutions affecting the interests of actors, they also affect the manner in which a policy concept is actually implemented, which is the third and final stage of the model. John Hudson et al provide a clear example of this in his comparison of Third Way policies in the United Kingdom and Germany (Hudson et al 2008). German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair were both Third Way proponents with a similar enough vision to publish a joint document of policy principles (Hudson et al 2008: 209). However, as Hudson points out, the institutional history of Germany and the UK are significantly different (Hudson et al 2008: 211). This meant that the actual application of these joint principles were different. For example Mr. Blair increased employment regulation and Mr. Schroder decreased employment regulation, which actually brought the two countries closer together (Hudson et al 2008: 217). This example demonstrates that even with the same ideas, institutions can create different policy outcomes.
This paper has been working with a simplified policy development model of ideas being adopted by interests then adaption by existing institutions. At each stage it is clear how different political systems can have different policy outcomes. Between polities ideas, interests, and institutions are all different. They each then have a different effect on the policy out comes in different polities.
(This is a thousand word essay I wrote for my graduate program. If anyone is interested in the references you can e-mail me for the bibliography hughmacintyre@aol.com)
Each of these concepts has a place within the policy process. Solutions and perceptions of issues originate with ideas. If there is a sufficiently powerful actor with an interest connected to that issue or solution, then the policy is placed on the political agenda. Once the various actors’ interests have been negotiated or pacified the policy is adopted by the institutions. The institutions then adapt the policy to fit the existing framework. This is a simplified model of how policy is developed and implemented. It is also a simplification of the relationship between the three concepts. This model will however serve to demonstrate the reasons that policy differs between polities.
Ideas, the first stage of the model, are fundamental in explaining the origin of policy (Beland 2009: 703). Daniel Beland writes that ideas shape assumptions, provide discursive tools for actors, and often shape the agenda (Beland 2009: 702). Ideas are the most significant for how they shape assumptions. Organizational institutionalists argue that cultural assumptions produce certain policy outcomes (Campbell 1998: 382). The example of this given by Frank Dobin (as cited Campbell 1998: 382) is the difference in which France and the United States of America handled the construction of a railway network. USA, with a more individualist cultural bias, was more decentralized in their railway construction than collectivist France.
Beyond affecting solutions, ideas can shape the perception of what needs to be solved. Jean-Claude Barbier discussed French concepts of employment precariousness and its lack of counterpart in the United Kingdom (Barbier 2004). French and British employment policy would thus differ greatly because United Kingdom officials would not consider precariousness whereas it would be central in France’s employment policy. The assumptions formed by ideas create this policy difference at the very beginning of the process.
In any polity there is a limited space for policy debate on the political agenda (Beland 2009: 705). It requires a significant actor, such as political parties, unions, public servants, or businesses, to move this policy onto the agenda (Campbell 1998: 379). This is the second stage of the model mentioned in the introduction.
Since policies require an interested actor to get on the political agenda, the variant interests and distribution in power within different polities explains differences between policy outcomes. Distribution of power is important because having an interested actor is not always enough. Some actors may not be powerful enough to overcome the counter interests of another actor (Galston 2006: 549). Iain McLean in his article Rational Choice and Politics enters into a discussion of the power relations between actors with his use of the prisoner’s dilemma (McLean 1991: 502). He first assumes that politicians and civil servants, as human beings, are self interested (McLean 1991: 500). They may occasionally act in the interests of the greater good, but it is extraordinarily rare that any human being would act radically against their own interest. It is therefore important to understand how power relations work to understand why some policies are implemented and others are not.
The power relations and indeed the interests of actors are partly shaped by the institutions (Pontusson 1995: 119). It is the institutionalized power relations and interests that are crucial to the development of policy (Pontusson 1995: 120). Consider the electoral system as an example of an institution that shapes interests. Kenneth Arrow points out that in any electorate there are many possible majorities and it is the institutions that give them shape (Galston 2006: 545). A real world example of a policy affected by an electoral system would be the USA’s environmental policy bias towards ethanol fuel. The reason for this bias can easily be traced to the order of Presidential primaries, which give corn growers in Iowa disproportionate power. Presidential candidates give their support for ethanol to ensure that they would gain an early lead against their opponents. In this way the institution of the electoral system influences the policies that politicians have an interest in.
Beyond institutions affecting the interests of actors, they also affect the manner in which a policy concept is actually implemented, which is the third and final stage of the model. John Hudson et al provide a clear example of this in his comparison of Third Way policies in the United Kingdom and Germany (Hudson et al 2008). German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair were both Third Way proponents with a similar enough vision to publish a joint document of policy principles (Hudson et al 2008: 209). However, as Hudson points out, the institutional history of Germany and the UK are significantly different (Hudson et al 2008: 211). This meant that the actual application of these joint principles were different. For example Mr. Blair increased employment regulation and Mr. Schroder decreased employment regulation, which actually brought the two countries closer together (Hudson et al 2008: 217). This example demonstrates that even with the same ideas, institutions can create different policy outcomes.
This paper has been working with a simplified policy development model of ideas being adopted by interests then adaption by existing institutions. At each stage it is clear how different political systems can have different policy outcomes. Between polities ideas, interests, and institutions are all different. They each then have a different effect on the policy out comes in different polities.
(This is a thousand word essay I wrote for my graduate program. If anyone is interested in the references you can e-mail me for the bibliography hughmacintyre@aol.com)
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